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AGRICULTURAL TRANSFORMATION IN SSA:
Some Reflections
By Reginald Herbold Green
The small boy who breaks a pot goes to tell 
his mother 'It got broken', not 'I broke the pot' 
but 'it got broken'... And who did this?
We did. We broke the pot.
- Jerry John Rawlings 
Head of State,. Ghana
Agriculture has performed poorly in Sub-Saharan 
Africa with average growth considerably lower than 
population growth, and low in comparison to other 
developing countries. ... Food security in SSA has 
deteriorated since independence. .., Chronic food 
insecurity is the primary manifestation of - .. increasing 
poverty ... the inability of the poor to either produce 
or to buy adequate food.
- Kevin Cleaver, World Bank
Three problems that will dominate development thinking 
in the 1990s are already identifiable ... employment ... 
food production ... environmental resource protection.
- Robert Paarlberg and 
Michael bxpfcan
An Overview: Decline, Disagreement and Divergence
Sub-Saharan Africa fared ill in terms of GDP in the late 1960s and early 
1970s, well over 1976-79, abysmally over 1980-85 and erratically and 
unevenly - but on balance not much better - over 1986-90. The agricultural 
record was rather worse until the 1980s and the improvement in 
export/industrial crop production over the past decade has been wiped out
2in value by terms of trade shifts. Food production per capita has declined 
secularly - albeit with numerous national exceptions - since the mid-1960s 
and industrial/export crop volume at Sub-Continental level actually fell in 
the 1970s before recovering to quite slow growth in the 1980s.
In the 1980s, a series of parallel declines were common. Rural physical 
infrastructure - rarely ever even minimally adequate - crumbled in the face 
of non-maintenance and war. So did rural commercial infrastructure - 
private as well as public. With few exceptions, the moderate to draconic 
declines in provision of basic human or human investment services (adult 
and primary education, primary and mother/child health care, water) were 
disproportionately higher in rural areas which were already much less well 
served. Agricultural research and extension measured by quantities of 
personnel and even deflated expenditure rose but their actual value/quality 
declined in most cases. Food security weakened for rural drought and war 
victims and for vulnerable urban groups as rural surpluses for urban 
provisioning declined. Rural real (self-provisioning plus cash) household 
incomes fell, albeit except in the war ravaged rural areas - usually by 
proportionately less than in urban areas (and by proportionately less for 
food crop than for industrial/export crop sellers). Growing poverty and 
growing population interacted to increase the scope and rate of regress of 
environmental degradation which in turn locked more households into deeper
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poverty and - on balance - increased both rural exodus (usually to urban 
poverty) and rural populations. By 1990 the World Bank1 found SSA 
displacing South and Southeast Asia as the 'leader' in the proportion of 
households in absolute poverty stakes.
World Bank Structural Adjustment strategies have sought to overcome this 
deeply unsatisfactory record. Unlike IMF Stabilisation2 they have focused 
on real (physical quantity) output (supply) expansion to be achieved over
3the medium term. Their prime ideological/analytical construct has been 
reallocation of resources more efficiently in terms of unit output to input 
ratios. By and large more total resource use (via Consultative Group 
mobilisation first, later complemented by restored growth) has been their 
motto at least from 1984/85 onward with agricultural output and 
agriculturalist incomes seen as gainers from both processes.
But the SA approach has been very much price and market centred with rather 
limited attention to complementary factors (whose existence and importance 
have not been denied so much as set aside at least until 1989/903). Given 
the physical infrastructural, structural, research and development and 
technological constraints, this is arguably a far too narrow approach even 
on the basis of Bank staff computed relative responsiveness of output to 
price and non-price measures.'1
1980's agricultural results have, at the best, remained inadequate. Given 
that Structural Adjustment has been a major strategic theme both externally 
and (whether by parallel thinking, persuasion and/or the necessity of 
bowing to donor/lender preferences to secure finance and foreign exchange) 
internally, that is quite enough to say that SA - in its own terms - is not 
succeeding. Sustainable growth either in terms of per capita rises and 
lessened dependence on external transfers is not happening in most of SSA. 
Even where the first is present it is often underwritten by external 
transfers to cover external imbalance gaps which - even on Bank 
projections5 - show no signs whatsoever of narrowing in the 1990s.
Like the Human Dimension critique of UNICEF6 and of the Khartoum 
Conference', this argument does not require demonstrating that results 
would have been better without SA. In most cases in which SA has been 
attempted, the reverse is more plausible. But no strategy presiding over
4growing absolute poverty and food insecurity plus declining agricultural 
output per capita and falling average real rural household incomes can 
claim to be working acceptably even though certain other approaches might 
well do worse.
The more relevant question - unless one truly believes that unplanned, 
unsystematic, omnipresent price distortions (whatever their historic 
origins) are a good thing - is: What else is needed in a coherent,
potentially viable agricultural strategy? Some fairly obvious contenders 
are: effective access to seeds and tools; improvement of physical and 
commercial infrastructure; restructuring research and extension to provide 
more relevant inputs (especially of tested, adopted knowledge) more 
effectively; extended access to basic human/human investment services; food 
security especially in respect to household self-provisioning (so-called 
"subsistence"); environment protection and rehabilitation (with special 
attention to shrubs - bushes - trees, fuel and simple building materials, 
agro-forestry and water use); pastoralism and mixed farming (including 
micro and national level land allocation). Three perhaps less evident ones 
are women's workload (often the binding constraint on output); rural self­
organisation (operational co-ops and policy influencing associations); 
improved data (including actual household income, expenditure and time use 
budgets - budgets because most rural households do not have single but 
gender segmented budgets for each) so that there can be better monitoring 
of trends and ascertaining of levels. A more disputed element - at least 
in the "freehold registered title" form usually proposed - is land tenure 
reform.s
5A Record of Mixed Failure and Survival
To review the SSA agricultural record since 1980 or 1965 would be tediously 
lengthy and perhaps not much to the point since the macro regional and 
country data, for what they are worth, are readily accessible.9
What may be of more interest are three different points which in no way 
refute the generally deeply unsatisfactory picture and trends but do cast 
some doubts on the direct applicability of generalisations to policy and 
may suggest ways forward. These are shaky data, uneven results and mass 
survival.
First, the data are almost incredibly bad. For some countries agricultural 
output growth trend estimates range from 2% to 3.5% and those for 
population from 2.75% to 3.5% a year. Evidently the difference between 
+0.75% and -1.5% per capita trends is not insignificant. At household 
level the budgetary (sources, uses, inputs - of cash, food, shelter and 
time) data are virtually non-existent in forms relevant to articulated 
agricultural policy and programming. Fairly simple techniques like crop 
cutting samples linked to satellite photo analysis or district by district 
small sample surveys of households (on a quick and nasty basis) are not 
being done, while far less evidently priority statistical exercises gobble 
up personnel, finance and foreign exchange.
Second, results are uneven. A substantial number of countries do have food 
production growth above that of population over 1985-90. Excluding war 
ravaged countries, these probably encompass a majority of Africans. In 
several years substantial nominally exportable grain surpluses have existed 
in several countries with triangular food aid finance and transport the 
main barriers to export. An overlapping - but not identical - group of 
countries have export and industrial crop volume growth rates of 3% or
6above. None of this really offsets the fact that to achieve reasonable 
physical access to food security with modest reductions in food aid SSA 
needs a 4% annual output trend to 2010 and even if the historic 2% trend is 
understated, keyed to inflated estimates of population growth or has 
changed, the highest likely average trend estimate is 2.5%. But the 
divergences - and the divergences in, inter alia, peasant political power, 
infrastructural adequacy, rural services trends and research/extension 
effectiveness which seem relevant in several of the cases suggest not only 
that "getting the prices right" is not enough (now - unlike 1981 - rarely 
contested) but also some of the items to explore in seeking an "enough" 
package.
The third point is that most rural Africans have survived and have survived 
on the base of their agricultural (crops - livestock - forestry - fishing) 
production. Indeed the most drastic average falls in living standards have 
been for urban areas at least so far as nutrition and household incomes go. 
The exceptions are: rural populations ravaged by war; drought victims 
forced by the lateness of support programmes to flee from their homes and 
livelihoods (and very rarely given effective support to re-establish them); 
households from seriously over-populated and/or ecologically damaged areas. 
It is not accidental that many of these people flee to towns - a push not a 
pull - where they make up the least able to survive (and the least provided 
with public services) urban groups and tend to create a false labour market 
below the minimum "efficiency wage" or its productivity analogue in the 
"informal" employment/self-employment sector. These groups are not victims 
of agricultural policy as such but of insecurity, faulty and tardy response 
to disasters and either technological stagnation or inadequate 
opportunities for rural - rural migration. The long term survival support, 
macroeconomic distortion (inefficiently low10 urban remuneration of labour)
7and sluggish agricultural output growth costs as well as in human misery 
terms are very large. Evidently they vary rarely relate to agricultural 
pricing.
But, as noted, most agricultural households have survived in agriculture. 
When their nutritional status has worsened secularly - by no means always 
the case - this often seems to relate to the decline in non-crop cash 
income (surprisingly high - frequently 25% nationally and in areas with 
substantial remittances sometimes over 50%) forcing additional food sales 
out of barely adequate food production to meet cash necessities (salt, 
tools, clothes, fees, transport, etc.). The Northern and Upper Regions of 
Ghana are among the clearest examples of this malaise which may be more 
readily tackled by restoring non-crop incomes than by crop price or market 
changes (especially since Ghanaian food crop marketing is private and - 
very imperfect - market, not official price or state agency, dominated.)
The SSA food deficit is basically urban and results from very large rises 
in the per cent of urban population combined with low rates of growth of 
average output per rural household which have not generated adequate 
increases in marketed output. The mechanics are simple: if 95% of 
households basically grow and 5% buy food a 6% surplus above self­
provisioning by growers balances the market but if the ratio shifts to 75%
to 25% then a 33% surplus (a 25% output growth per producing household) is
needed. That shift is not atypical of 1960-1990 demographic structure
adjustment in much of SSA. On the very shaky evidence output per peasant 
household has - on average - grown secularly but not fast enough. It 
should be noted that this pattern is in general as true of countries with 
no official grower prices or single channel marketing as of these with.
The exceptional cases of secular food surpluses in non-drought years also 
occur on both sides of that divide.
8Structural Adjustment: Price, Market and Macro Policy Conditionality
Structural adjustment programming as perceived by the World Bank begins 
with macroeconomic policy reform because it believes that a bad macro 
policy context leads to sectoral policy and project failure - a disabling 
context. That argument while pseudo empirical (SSA did grow slowly in the 
early 1970s and the 1980s compared to the 1955-65 period - or to 1976-79 - 
and to other developing and other low income regions) was basically 
intellectual and political. This is not to deny that in some cases it was 
correct. Agricultural project lending had a high failure rate in SSA - 
albeit on a per cent of investment basis not in other regions - but many of 
the reasons were project or related project specific, not macro policy 
framework derivatives.
The same reasons - plus the relative ease of setting and monitoring 
conditions - led to emphasis on price changes (e.g. exchange rates, real 
interest rates) and on reducing direct bureaucratic and regulatory and 
indirect state enterprise involvement with market management (or massaging 
or interference depending on viewpoint). These measures were seen as 
likely to raise the relative prices of tradeables (including marketed food) 
and especially of exportables (including main export crops). The impact of 
reducing subsidies to agriculture (e.g. on tools, seed, fertiliser) early 
on was not seriously analysed even for surplus producing/selling farmers 
let alone for the majority who were basically self-provisioning and used 
non-crop cash incomes to finance household produced and consumed crop 
production.
Further, because Structural Adjustment Programmes were usually begun in 
demonstrably import starved and infrastructure deteriorating economies,
9most Bank lending tended to be for quick disbursing import support to keep 
the economy running and for infrastructural rehabilitation.
Sectoral programmes were often ones whose policy conditions were tied to 
the sector - e.g. agriculture - but whose import support was not either at 
the level of goods imported or government use of the local currency 
proceeds when these goods were sold. In fact project agricultural lending 
in SSA declined as a per cent both of total lending and of project 
lending.11 Given the Bank's leadership role in mobilising external 
finance, bilateral grants/loans followed that pattern rather than 
offsetting it.
The concentration on prices - and official prices at that - meant that SAP 
policy basically effected (or could be expected to effect positively) the 
commercialised portion of production and within it export and domestic 
industrial input crops for which official prices and marketing was both 
more general and harder or more costly to by-pass.
In fact taking SSA as a whole it is probable that only about 40% of 
agricultural output falls in those classes (20% export/domestic industrial, 
20% marketed food, 60% household self-provisioning food). And of that 40% 
probably half either was not covered by official channels and prices even 
on paper or had effectively by-passed them.
As a result, it seems likely that only 20-25% of SSA agriculture was 
significantly affected by relative price shifts resulting from SAP's and 
their nationally designed analogues and probably under 10% of total food 
production. Clearly the generality of the macro-sectoral pricing changes 
as instruments to alter resource allocations and production trends was much 
less than was - or even now is - recognised.
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The empirical evidence on price elasticities sometimes used to justify this 
strategic approach was at best shaky. Much of it was single crop, two 
variable (real crop price/marketed output) based. That is no proxy for an 
overall agricultural output/price elasticity even assuming there were no 
non-price constraints on supply response to price. In fact most overall 
elasticities have proven to be low and - according to an IMF study12 - 
statistically insignificant. A Bank study suggests that official pricing 
policy differences explain about a tenth of variation in agricultural 
output trends among SSA countries.13 As the elasticities are positive this 
is not an argument against repricing - especially via devaluation impact in 
respect to export crops - but a warning that dealing with one-tenth of a 
problem's causation is unlikely to be adequate as a main strategic approach 
to solving it.
To be at all balanced it is necessary to underline that in principle the 
Bank has always held that Structural Adjustment for agriculture had to go 
beyond price shifts and market freeing. Even in the initial 1981 
Accelerated Development report14 a host of complementary measures are 
listed. But with few exceptions these have not been key components of 
Policy Framework Papers, of strategic conceptualization and elaboration or 
of major resource allocations.
More recently there have been major shifts at least at analytical level in 
the Long Term Perspective Study, in the 1990 World Development Report with 
its focus on absolute poverty and in the forthcoming Population- 
Agriculture-Environment study for SSA.ls These do focus on absolute 
poverty reduction, food security, decent livelihoods - a return to 
President McNamara's 1970s crusade against absolute poverty as LTPS, 
explicitly recognises. In part this shift comes because the most blatant 
price distortions and marketing muddles have been tackled with substantial
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(if very uneven) success. In part it represents the growing intellectual 
and political concerns about poverty, hunger and the environment. And in 
part it illustrates that the World Bank does draw on the lessons of 
experience - not excluding its own mistakes or inadequacies even if it is 
somewhat "economical" as to explicitly saying so in public print.16
But these shifts to date have not informed policy, resource allocation or - 
a fortiori - staff development and disbursement levels. Therefore, the 
1980s record of SA in SSA is basically the result (or non-result) of 
macroeconomic price and market freeing conditionalities and their 
implementation.
The Record Revisited
The last decade's agricultural growth over SSA as a whole is of the order 
of 2% to 2.5% with food about 2% and non-food probably somewhat higher. 
There are some significant divergences - Southern Africa appears to be 
performing better (especially if war torn Angola and Mozambique are 
excluded from tlje average). Indeed excluding war devastated states - 
Ethiopia/Eritrea, Sudan, Angola, Mozambique, Chad - it is possible that 
overall production and population are roughly parallel.17 That is not 
comforting for three reasons. To reduce import requirements and achieve 
reasonable national levels of calorific availability would require a 4% 
annual growth trend for food to 2,010. To sustain import capacity and 
sustain/increase domestic inputs into manufacturing would require about a 
6% annual trend for non-food products. For the war wracked economies 
significantly higher than average rates would be needed because of the 
poorer starting point.
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The 1980s trend in food - albeit not in other crops - is not significantly 
better than that of the 1970s so there is little reason to believe a 
secular turning point has been passed. Further, most of the output 
increase has come from extensive use of land and from reduction of fallow 
periods - both probably unsustainable and potentially environmentally 
deadly under present techniques.ia
That panorama does not suggest SA has greatly enhanced agricultural 
production trends. In the case of food there is no real evidence adjusters 
have done better than non-adjusters. For export production there is 
evidence but not, to date, of sustained or rapid growth above old peak 
levels.
Agricultural investment has fallen as a share of total SSA investment, of 
Bank lending and of ODA.19 While it is true that supporting fixed
t
investment needed by agriculture may in fact be largely infrastructural and 
service provision20, there is no evidence of any such shift within rural 
investment rather than an absolute and relative decline.
The 1970s fashion for "integrated rural development" has been dropped on
the grounds that it was too complex to work well and rarely produced rapid 
increases in output. That does not resolve the problem it was intended to 
overcome - parallel provision of complementary infrastructure, basic 
services and applicable agricultural technology/inputs. The complexity 
problem appears to have arisen from creating "parallel government" units 
for IRDPs rather than coordinating parallel sectoral activity within 
existing state institutions. The disappointing output results often appear 
to flow from the absence of any plausible agricultural care in IRDPs21 - an
error perhaps easier to see in retrospect than at the time.
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Policy interventions have focused on prices and institutions - with much 
less physical programming than in the late 1960s or 1970s - with very mixed 
results. In Tanzania, for example, the Marketing Development Bureau's 
price advice created huge deficits on domestic food crops and radical 
disincentives for export crop production, while its oversight of 
agricultural marketing bodies was paralleled not only by a wholesale 
collapse from modest surpluses taking one year with another to catastrophic 
losses and an even more stunning collapse of ability to keep, use or 
produce accounts. Admittedly an extreme example of Bank-led initiatives 
into increasing national agricultural policy and monitoring capacity, MDB 
was hardly unique in kind.
In the 1980s both Bank and most SSA national research, technical policy 
appraised and programme/project evaluation capacity in agriculture has 
declined. There are less high level personnel, working less effectively 
with poorer data and with research/extension systems which (including donor 
funding) have rising numbers of staff and of real spending but apparently 
falling real outputs.22
The issue is not whether Structural Adjustment caused this record, nor even 
whether it would have been marginally worse without it. If Structural 
Adjustment is held out as a package for regaining sustainable growth and is 
used as the main catalyst for mobilising and allocating external resources 
- as it is in half of SSA - then it has an obligation to address food and 
overall agricultural production problematics more effectively than it has 
to date.
To say this is not to argue that clear-cut alternatives have to date been 
conceptualised or articulated for SSA as a whole or in most countries.
ECA'S African Alternatives (like its intellectual predecessor The Lagos
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Plan of Action) is very short of programmes and policies for the rural 
sector beyond throwing money at agricultural investment (unspecified).23 
The Bank's LTPS2"1 has a coherent conceptual check-list and some strategic 
linking but also remains far from articulation and clearly spelled out 
priorities and paths. The forthcoming Bank sectoral study may make several 
breakthroughs in this respect.25
Toward An Agenda: Some Themes and Linkages
Reviewing the record and what Structural Adjustment has not stressed may at 
least provide an agenda for conceptualisation, prioritisation and 
articulation. What can be said briefly or for SSA as a whole tends to be 
general and at several removes from operationality. Price formulae and 
guide-lines may be applicable across crops, livestock, ecological zones and 
infrastructural bases (even if they do not produce as clear and correct 
results without local adaptation as some proponents have supposed) but for 
most other elements the degree of diversity and down to earth formulation 
needed for positive results is much greater.25
The broad goal is to enable farmers to produce more for household self­
provisioning and for sale. Given that perhaps 75% of production is by 
small family farmers, of that perhaps 70% is consumed in the producing 
household and that small farming households dominate both rural and 
national population and households in absolute poverty, production by poor 
people needs to be stressed for output as well as distribution (and socio­
political) reasons.
For farmers to produce more they require better access to inputs - e.g. 
seeds, tools, seedlings, breeding stock, fertiliser, in some cases
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implements and chemicals. They are frequently not available and action to 
ensure that they are (whether via public or private channels) deserves more 
attention than it usually receives.
A parallel input need is knowledge. African long rotation systems are 
increasingly no longer viable because of rising household/land ratios and 
the push outward into marginal (in quality and/or rainfall security) areas 
poses problems many farmers find difficult to master. In the long term 
this requires prioritised, targeted research (now perhaps beginning, e.g. 
in Zimbabwe, Botswana, SADCC Agricultural and Livestock Research Programme, 
the International Centre for Inset Pathology and Environment) but that will 
take up to a decade to provide proven, adapted new knowledge. What may be 
possible faster is identifying best used "peasant" techniques, testing for 
ecological limits and - via retrained, more flexible extension services - 
broadening their use.
Markets frequently need improvement - both in access to buyers and to goods 
to buy. Because most businessmen satisfice (rather than maximise) and 
because rural business is harder and riskier enabling market improvement 
may require state action beyond improving infrastructure. Targeted lending 
and training for rural based entrepreneurs (not least co-ops) and - when 
imports/domestic manufactures - are objectively scarce in rural areas 
improving their access to (allocations from) importers, manufacturers, 
wholesalers deserve scrutiny (even if not unqualified or unexamined 
adoption).
Rural infrastructure and rural basic service provision both require 
rehabilitation and/or expansion. Both are directly (currently) as well as 
indirectly (a decade ahead) productive. Bad roads - bridges - etc., deter 
traders and worsen rural real purchasing power. Lack of warehouses raises
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wastage. Sick persons and those tending them are not productive. Adult 
education and extension (properly viewed a form of adult education) have 
fast pay-off. Accessible pure water could often increase the time women 
have available for agricultural activity by up to a third.
Environmental protection matters to poor farmers who are forced by need to 
degrade their and their children's future livelihoods to survive now. Two 
key questions are knowledge of how (technically and economically) to move 
from long rotation (so-called "shifting cultivation") to short rotation 
systems without damaging the land and how to manage poorer soils and more 
variable climates to avoid neo-desertification and erosion. Some knowledge 
exists and should be extended (e.g. more intensive grazing with more 
frequent rotation to improve pasture, break up packed soil, reduce 
erosion); some could be adopted from other areas. But the main 
breakthroughs remain to be made; will largely need to be national and 
regional; and should be identified by 1995 as 1995-2010 research 
priorities.
However, in respect to trees-bushes-shrubs, rather more is known about how 
to enable rural households to reintroduce them and to avoid degradation 
damaging to soil (e.g. erosion), diet (lack of fuel and tree food 
products), women's workload (time to get fuel), shelter (e.g. poles and 
thatch) and incomes (from food, fodder, fuel and building material sales). 
What seem to be lacking are systematic national programmes designed with 
proposed beneficiary participation from the design stage and backed by 
significant resource allocations.
Governance has, oddly given its current fashionability, rarely been 
incorporated into agricultural sector proposals. Two aspects deserve 
priority - but case by case - attention: farmer joint operations (e.g. co­
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ops in marketing, transport and - less often - production) and effective 
farmer presentation of agendas (e.g farmers organisations making specific 
proposals to all levels of government and both regularly and publicly 
monitoring performance as they see it). The key to both is farmer - not 
expert manager nor technocrat nor politician - control. What is often most 
needed is "space to breathe" but, especially for co-ops, access to credit, 
goods and specific training may often be crucial as well.
Gender issues have reached the rhetorical and aspiration agenda and - on 
occasion - micro implementation. Strategic conceptualisation, articulation 
and integration into overall sectoral strategy largely remain to be 
accomplished.
The key facts are that up to two-thirds of person days devoted to crop 
production are female and that most rural African women suffer from 14 to 
16 hour workloads, at least during peak crop labour demand periods. To 
increase output more rapidly requires enabling women to increase their 
productivity. How is less clear-cut. Better access to health facilities 
and more preventative medicine (women tend the sick), provision of access 
to water (women and girls fetch it), tree-shrub-bush protection and 
regeneration (women collect fuel) may often afford faster, surer gains than 
crop production technology changes. Food processing and storage sometimes 
offer comparable "easy" gains. However, input access also hinders women's 
productivity especially where they produce primarily food for household 
provisioning and have low cash incomes.
That leads to a related area - studying household time, income (cash or 
kind) and expenditure (cash or kind) budgets which are rarely unified 
except in female-headed households. Lack of knowledge on these budgets
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makes projection of policy impact on overall output shaky and on household 
nutrition virtually impossible.27
For about 35 to 40 million rural Africans the first priority is peace 
followed by livelihood rehabilitation. War has destroyed their fields, 
homes, food security and assets. Peace, by itself, will not allow them to 
return home, clear their fields, rebuild their homes, plant their crops and 
tend their animals until food and income flow. Their need are inputs (to 
clear and to build as well as to plant and to till), livestock, transport, 
food until harvest, cash incomes (e.g. from public works to restore 
infrastructure), markets, services, infrastructure.
To date, few programmes for rural rehabilitation have been devised or 
implemented. Donors tend to fund survival calamity relief on the one hand 
and longer term development support on the other - post crisis livelihood 
rehabilitation is lost in between. National priority setting often (not 
always - e.g Mozambique) suffers from the same blind spot.
If the foregoing agenda is to be acted on, a series of operational 
implications follow. First, broad access, low user cost programmes 
(largely on what are normally styled "Recurrent Budget" heads) not limited 
access, high user (or employee) cost, projects are the only feasible 
central instruments.
Second, agricultural strategy needs to be coordinated with - inter alia - 
infrastructural and basic service strategy and that coordination (not 
institutional integration) can be productive only if carried through to 
field operational, monitoring and review levels.
Third, governments need to be more selective in what they do, concentrating 
on what no one else can provide (e.g. prioritised, targeted research and
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extension; sectoral and household knowledge collection and analysis; 
infrastructure; basic services; rehabilitation). In other activities - 
e.g. marketing and, especially, production - they should place more stress 
on enabling farmers, co-ops and enterprises to do more.
For the Bank, and donors generally, this agenda would require a re-ordering 
of priorities in terms of finance (urban - rural, intra-rural and project 
vs general support), of personnel and of approach to the sector. Even more 
crucial, it would require moving away from multiple, parallel interventions 
which make any national strategy hard to formulate and impossible to 
implement. In the 1980s technical assistance and donor support have become 
so pervasive, dominant and fragmented in many SSA countries as to become a 
major forced decapacitating national agricultural policy, programming, 
monitoring and accountability.
This agenda does not include creating enabling macroeconomic frameworks - 
not least adopting and maintaining realistic exchange rates and pro-rural 
(or neutral) tax policies. This is largely because they are already on 
most government's agendas and a good deal has been done. Privatisation is 
not listed because private/public sector issues are, perhaps, more 
effectively considered in national contexts and in the contexts of the 
issues already listed than in somewhat unreal contrasting of bureaucratic 
planning and perfect markets. Certainly the scope of many public 
institutions' activities - and their costs - can and should be cut.
Ghana's Cocoa Marketing Board is an ongoing (if to date partial) success 
story. But ill-planned privatisation - e.g. from Crop Authorities to Co­
ops outside both state and farmer control in Tanzania - is unlikely to be 
very productive.
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Similarly, the priorities suggested cut against new large scale 
agricultural enterprises (public or private) as the main way forward and - 
given a record of 50 years of failure - against heavy reliance on large 
scale irrigation schemes except as a by-product of power production or 
under quite special ecological conditions. They also - simply because 
state capacity is limited - suggest that closing down, peasantising or 
joint venturising many public sector production units may well be a good 
idea. However, the reasons are to free decision taking capacity, high 
level professionals and investment resources for the priority list, not any 
general hope that these adjustments would in more than a handful of special 
cases significantly alter agricultural sector growth rates or national food 
security by direct increases in output from the present enterprises.
tIn Summation
The SSA agricultural record since 1965 - in production growth, ecological 
sustainability, food security, export generation and domestic industrial 
input supply - is depressing (especially for most African farmers and food 
buyers - categories by no means so mutually exclusive as is sometimes 
supposed). The 1980-90 record is barely better than that of 1970-80 and 
the gains in growth trends appear to be entirely in export production. The 
record is uneven - some countries do have production growth trends at or 
above those of population. Most rural Africans have survived by producing 
and most of those who have not have been the victims of the interaction of 
war and drought.
Structural adjustment has not been able to reverse this record of downward 
(per capita) drift except in several cases in respect to exports. That is 
not good enough for an overall strategy. Even if the causes for the
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decline lies outside SA (as they usually do) a transformation to 
sustainable growth, food security, poverty reduction and ecological 
sustainability must achieve more than prevent further worsening of already 
deeply unsatisfactory performance.
An agenda of issues to enable African farmers to produce more and the state 
to prioritise its actions and resource allocations to creating an enabling 
context can be sketched. It is far broader than the macro or price 
policies which, in practice, have been at the core of 1980s Agricultural 
Sectoral Structural Adjustment. Infrastructure, basic services, knowledge 
creation, ecological protection from need and increasing women's ability to 
produce by reducing non-agricultural workload are central to it.
That agenda requires more detailed, context specific, African articulation 
than does pricing policy. It also requires a shift of resources to 
programmes enabling many farmers from projects employing or serving a few. 
That is in standard terms a shift from capital (bricks and mortar, often 
unwisely termed "Development") budgets to recurrent. And it is much more 
intensive in respect to knowledge, personnel and interaction with farmers 
(especially women farmers) than almost all present African national 
agricultural sector operations. Further, to operate on it requires that 
donors cease decapacitating national agricultural strategy and 
implementation by running fragmented, donor controlled agricultural policy, 
institution and/or project enclaves; but do not at the same time withdraw 
allocations of resources.
The difficulties which acting on these implications to implement this 
agenda would pose are daunting. However, the alternatives have over a 
quarter century produced very unsatisfactory results. Few of the items on 
the agenda are, in themselves, very controversial. They have, however,
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rarely been seen as central rather than peripheral nor viewed in relation 
to each other. With the increasing realisation that neither enclave 
projects, heavy handed bureaucratic adumbration of (largely by-passed) 
rules and channels nor tunnel vision concentration on prices meets the 
objective test of enabling farmers to produce 4% to 5% more a year, the 
interest in new agendas and on sectoral strategy and action transformation 
is growing.
To be facilely optimistic or to sell any new agenda as a cure all or style 
of the year would be foolish - SSA has suffered enough from both of these 
patterns. But to explore, to decide and to build cumulatively (with 
reviews and adjustments) is as necessary for African governments and 
agricultural professionals today as it has always been for African farmers.
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